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INTRODUCTION
The public pension pigeons are coming home to roost. The highprofile bankruptcy filing by the City of Detroit, Michigan has brought
to the fore the relationship between pension underfunding and the
financial difficulties faced by an increasing number of American
municipalities and states. The problem is likely to continue to grow
with more municipalities finding it necessary to explore the
bankruptcy option. It has even been suggested that states should be
allowed to use bankruptcy to reduce their pension liabilities.1
Trillions of dollars promised to millions of current and retired public
employees are at stake.
Scholarship concerning the public pension crisis has focused on
disagreements over actuarial calculations and the legal principles that
constrain state and local pension reform.2 While there is no doubt
*
Professor of Law and Harry Elwood Warren Scholar, Boston University School of
Law. Thanks to the Fordham Urban Law Journal for inviting me to participate in the
Cooper-Walsh Colloquium for which this Essay was prepared. Thanks also to the
participants in the colloquium for their helpful suggestions on this Essay, including
Clayton Gillette, Patricia Salkin, and Paul Secunda. This Essay is dedicated to the
memory of Irving “Pro” Boim, a lifetime public school teacher in Ann Arbor,
Michigan, who epitomized the public servant earning a pension through dedicated
service.
1. See, e.g., David A. Skeel, Jr., States of Bankruptcy, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 677
(2012).
2. The description of scholarship on the public pension crisis is drawn from an
earlier Article. See generally Jack M. Beermann, The Public Pension Crisis, 70
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 3 (2013).

999

1000

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

[Vol. XLI

that pension liabilities are an important contributing factor to the
fiscal difficulties of municipalities like Detroit, disagreement remains
concerning the magnitude of the problem nationwide. On the fiscal
side, some analysts contend that major reform is necessary to avert a
widespread fiscal crisis, while others conclude that moderate change
would be sufficient to resolve the fiscal difficulties faced by most
public pension plans.3 On the legal side, some analysts bemoan the
straitjackets in which many public entities find themselves due to
state law that severely limits pension reform, while others claim that
there is sufficient legal flexibility to accommodate necessary reforms.4
Little attention has been focused on the workers and retirees who are
likely to suffer if their current or future payments are reduced
substantially in order to restore their current or former employers to
fiscal health.
In another comprehensive Article, The Public Pension Crisis,5 I
addressed many of the issues surrounding widespread underfunding
of public pension liabilities at municipal and state levels in the United
States. Although there is no question that many governmental units
have fallen far short of actuarially sound contribution levels to their
pension funds, I noted that there is significant disagreement over
whether this underfunding presents a true fiscal crisis. While some
analysts claim that many states and cities may be insolvent, others
conclude that modest increases in pension contributions would
resolve the problem. Further, in tight fiscal times, many state and
local governments have cut payments to pension funds to balance the
budget.6
I then explored in the prior Article whether public pension
promises are excessive or abusive, and if so why governments would
promise excessive pensions.7 It turns out that this is controversial as
well; some analysts conclude that overall compensation to public
employees is significantly higher than compensation in the private

3. Mayors to the Rescue: An Attempt to Reform Pensions Could Pitch
Democrat Against Democrat, ECONOMIST (Oct. 24, 2013), http://www.economist.com
/news/united-states/21588395-attempt-reform-pensions-could-pitch-democrat-againstdemocrat-mayors-rescue.
4. See, e.g., AMY B. MONAHAN, NAT’L CTR. ON PERFORMANCE INCENTIVES,
LEGAL LIMITATIONS ON PUBLIC PENSION PLAN REFORM, at iii (2009) (discussing the
spectrum of legal regimes governing state pensions).
5. See Beermann, supra note 2.
6. See, e.g., Melanie Hicken, Firefighters, Teachers Face Smaller Retirement
Safety Net, CNNMONEY (Feb. 11, 2013, 5:57 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2013/02/11/
retirement/state-workers-pension-benefits.
7. See Beermann, supra note 2, at 16.
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sector, while others conclude that, if anything, public employees are
underpaid and better pensions are part of a tradeoff involving lower
salaries.8 I noted that incumbent politicians often depend on
government employees for political support, and even if only a small
percentage of public employees are politically connected, favorable
compensation including pensions would likely be provided to all
employees if only to boost the fortunes of the small, favored group.9
Further, underfunding pensions is a form of deficit spending under
which current taxpayers enjoy services that are paid for by later
taxpayers. I also illustrated that there are plenty of cases of abusive
conduct in the public pension arena, but it is not clear whether the
fact that there are some abuses means that the whole system should
be viewed with suspicion.
I then looked at legal constraints on public pension reform under
state and federal law. The weight of state constitutional law in many
states is on the side of government employees and retirees. Many
state constitutions contain provisions protecting pension rights that
have been interpreted to prohibit significant reductions in pension
promises to existing employees and retirees. State and local pension
reform is also constrained by the Contract Clause of the United States
Constitution, which prohibits state laws that impair the obligation of
contracts. Recently, this provision has been interpreted to apply most
strongly to states’ efforts to breach their own contracts. Municipal
bankruptcy under Chapter 9 of the Federal Bankruptcy Code
(Chapter 9) may provide an avenue of pension reform for some
insolvent municipalities.
State governments cannot employ
bankruptcy, but there is a chance that if a state decides to default on
its pension obligations, the federal courts would be powerless to order
a remedy.10
My Article concluded with a normative discussion of the plight of
state employees and retirees. Unless one believes that the average
state employee has been part of an abusive conspiracy to inflate
pensions at taxpayers’ expense, there is a strong normative case to be
made for relief aimed at preserving pension rights. State employees
accepted lower current pay in exchange for job security and favorable
retirement promises, and for those who were not part of the federal
Social Security system, their state or local pension may be their only

8. See, e.g., DALE BELMAN & JOHN HEYWOOD, ECON. POLICY INST., THE TRUTH
ABOUT PUBLIC EMPLOYEES 1, 3 (1993).
9. See Beermann, supra note 2, at 26.
10. For a discussion of the Eleventh Amendment issues surrounding damages
remedies for state Contract Clause violations, see Beermann, supra note 2, at 78–84.
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source of retirement income. Even well-paid state and local
government workers may have decided to accept government
employment or remain in government employment when other
opportunities arose in reliance on attractive pension promises. Public
pensions constitute contractual compensation, not gratuities, and in
the normal case there is a strong argument that government units
should be required to live up to these promises.
This Essay is an effort to provoke discussion of the normative
issues surrounding pension reform, mainly concerning how public
employees and retirees should be treated. Should pension claimants
be treated like any other unsecured creditor, or any other person who
suffers when the regulatory background is altered, or is there a case
for treating them as victims of a fiscal disaster beyond their control?
Is pension reform just one more step in the evolution of the labor
market that has made it much more difficult for lower-skilled workers
to achieve a middle class lifestyle? If so, how should the law react?
This Essay also discusses some of the fascinating federalism issues
raised by the potential clash between state law protecting pension
rights and federal bankruptcy standards. Should a federal bankruptcy
court respect the decision of a state court that the use of federal
bankruptcy to reduce pension obligations would violate state
constitutional protection of pension rights? This federalism dispute
may be the most interesting one in decades.
I. THE BANKRUPTCY HAMMER
Recent developments, particularly the bankruptcies of Central
Falls, Rhode Island, and Detroit, Michigan, should create unease over
the fairness and utility of municipal bankruptcy. In the Central Falls
bankruptcy, pension payments to existing retirees were cut by fiftyfive percent, while municipal general obligation bondholders were
paid in full.11 This occurrence may be surprising, because pension
claimants and general obligation bondholders are usually both
unsecured creditors, normally entitled to the same level of
compensation in bankruptcy. Full payment to bondholders was
apparently justified by fear of the negative impact on the ability of
Rhode Island municipalities to sell bonds in the future, referred to as

11. Jess Bidgood, Plan to End Bankruptcy in Rhode Island City Gains Approval,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 2012, at A21.
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the “contagion effect.”12 There was presumably no fear that the
market for municipal employees would be adversely affected.
One may wonder how the city could get away with treating one
group of unsecured creditors better than another. Due to concern
over the contagion effect, in the year before Central Falls filed its
petition in bankruptcy, the Rhode Island legislature passed a statute
granting general obligation bondholders a priority claim on city
revenues,13 basically elevating their legal status to secured creditors or
at least priority unsecured creditors, above the claims of other
unsecured creditors. From the point of view of the unsecured
creditors left behind, this seems incredibly unfair, because it
significantly reduced the funds available to pay the remaining
unsecured claims. In effect, the legislation retroactively altered the
priority among creditors, prejudicing some and privileging others. It
could be viewed, in effect if not in law, as a fraudulent conveyance or
illegal preference under which a substantial proportion of municipal
revenue was placed beyond the reach of unsecured creditors, long
after many of those creditors had extended credit to the municipality.
However, Chapter 9 explicitly prohibits a bankruptcy court from
interfering with the revenue and internal operation of the
municipality,14 so perhaps a bankruptcy court should respect state
adjustments to priority.
The legality of Rhode Island’s strategy was never litigated in
bankruptcy court.
Rather, the entire process was subject to
negotiation among the creditors.15 Realizing that they were going to
suffer serious reductions in their pension payments, the retired
workers went along with the plan after they convinced the Rhode
Island legislature to appropriate funds for a five-year cushion during
which the cuts to their pensions would be substantially less than the
ultimate goal of fifty-five percent. In actuality, pension holders may
have been treated better than the city’s other unsecured creditors
12. See Mary Williams Walsh, Cuts for the Already Retired, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19,
2011, at B1 (“The state law was intended to prevent a contagion effect, in which
Central Falls’s bankruptcy would frighten investors away from other cities’ bonds,
driving up borrowing costs across the state.”).
13. See R.I. Gen Laws § 45-12-1 (Supp. 2013).
14. See 11 U.S.C. § 904 (2012). In fact, my colleague Walter Miller suggests in a
recent Article that even without this statutory provision, the increased flexibility built
into Chapter 9 due to concerns over interference with government operations might
allow municipalities to favor one group of unsecured creditors over another. See
Walter W. Miller, Jr., Municipal Bonds in Chapter 9 Adjustment Proceedings, 9 No.
23 WESTLAW J. BANKR. 1, 5 (2013).
15. In municipal bankruptcy, there is a statutory requirement of negotiation with
creditors before filing. See 11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(5) (2012).
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(excepting bondholders). Other unsecured creditors may have lost
more than fifty-five percent of the value of their claims. The city’s
other unsecured creditors apparently did not challenge what might
have been viewed as relatively favorable treatment of pension
recipients, perhaps because there was not much money to fight over,
or because their interests were so devalued under municipal
bankruptcy law.
The story of the Central Falls bankruptcy shows that municipal
bankruptcy is a much more explicitly political animal than the typical
bankruptcy of a private corporation. The state government engaged
in long-term planning for the Central Falls bankruptcy, first by
securing the bondholders’ claims to avoid the negative consequences
to the rest of the bond market (had Central Falls defaulted), and then
by funding a cushion for pension claimants to convince them to agree
to the plan. The gridlock endemic to the United States Congress
makes it even more surprising to an outsider that the state legislature
could act in such a nimble, well-thought-out fashion.
Municipal bankruptcy has several unique features—the bankruptcy
court cannot appoint an outside trustee, the process cannot be
converted into a liquidation, and the bankruptcy court is prohibited
from taking steps that interfere with the exercise of the municipality’s
governmental powers.16
These special features of municipal
bankruptcy are obviously connected with an aspect of government
not available to private entities: taxing power. When a municipal
government decides to enter into bankruptcy, it is the product of a set
of decisions by municipal and state policymakers to take a hammer to
the municipality’s financial difficulties. The municipality could
increase taxes, cut expenditures, or both, and pay its debts. The state
could provide subsidies, perhaps as part of a plan to reform municipal
spending for the future. Of course, tax increases, spending cuts and
state subsidies may be unpopular with taxpayers and may damage the
municipality’s ability to recover, but they are possible alternatives to
bankruptcy. And a municipality could conceivably reach the limit of
its ability to tax, especially when higher taxes and cuts to services
drive taxpayers away. But the municipality and the state still have the
power to take steps to pay debts that private entities, dependent on
the market, do not.
In fact, Rhode Island’s legislative effort to protect bondholders at
the expense of other unsecured creditors illustrates the uneasy
16. See Michael W. McConnell & Randal C. Picker, When Cities Go Broke: A
Conceptual Introduction to Municipal Bankruptcy, 60 U CHI. L. REV. 425, 462–67
(1993).
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accommodation between Contract Clause principles and the federal
bankruptcy power. Of course, the whole point of bankruptcy is to
allow contracts to be broken. When an individual or a business is
insolvent, it is not unjust for all creditors to share in the losses
inherent in bankruptcy, in part because the bankruptcy process
ensures that creditors are treated fairly according to the priority of
their interests as recognized in state law. The fairness of bankruptcy
is reduced or destroyed if debtors are allowed to choose which
creditors to favor and which to disfavor, which was apparently done
in Rhode Island. However, municipalities have enormous power to
manipulate their finances even without state help—they can issue new
bonds and incur new obligations, which would dilute the value of
preexisting unsecured claims. They are also not bound by the usual
priority rules that apply in bankruptcy. But when the debtor is a
municipality, manipulation pursuant to the sovereign power of the
state may be contrary to the spirit of the Contract Clause even if it is
not contrary to its letter—it is as if the breach of contract was done
pursuant to state law rather than federal bankruptcy law.17
Perhaps, however, the tables could be turned and manipulation
could help pension claimants, especially in states where government
workers are still a politically favored class. If the Rhode Island
legislature can retroactively secure bondholders’ claims, presumably
states could secure public pension claims and prioritize them over
other unsecured municipal creditors. A state legislature could act to
protect pensioners by giving them a priority similar to the one granted
to bondholders in Rhode Island.
Many states have special
constitutional or statutory provisions protecting public pension rights,
such as the provision of the Michigan Constitution, which states, “The
accrued financial benefits of each pension plan and retirement system
of the state and its political subdivisions shall be a contractual
obligation thereof which shall not be diminished or impaired
thereby.”18 The wording of this provision and others like it is
designed in part to protect pension promises under the Contract
Clause of the United States Constitution, which protects contractual

17. This is why some bankruptcy courts and scholars of bankruptcy law have
rejected the idea that states can establish priorities among creditors that are
controlling in bankruptcy. See Cnty. of Orange v. Merrill Lynch & Co. (In re Cnty. of
Orange), 191 B.R. 1005, 1017 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1996); 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶
507.02 (15th ed. 1995) (“State legislatures cannot create bankruptcy priorities.”);
MARTIN J. BIENENSTOCK & ANDREA G. MILLER, SITUATIONAL UPDATE ON
DETROIT’S CHAPTER 9 CASE: MICHIGAN AND DETROIT’S HIGH STAKES CHAPTER 9
CONSTITUTIONAL GAMBLES 18–19 (2013).
18. MICH. CONST. art. 9, § 24.
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promises but not the benefits of non-contractual regulatory
programs.19 However, it is uncertain whether this language would be
sufficient to create any special priority for pension promises under
federal bankruptcy law.20
The most interesting controversy to date over the interaction
between state law protecting pension rights and federal bankruptcy
law is occurring right now in Detroit. Michigan law allows municipal
governments to pursue bankruptcy, but only with the permission of
the Governor.21 If an Emergency Manager has been appointed, as is
the case in Detroit, then the Emergency Manager may pursue federal
bankruptcy, but again only with the permission of the Governor and
only after the Emergency Manager concludes that “no reasonable
alternative to rectifying the financial emergency of the local
government which is in receivership exists.”22 The political nature of
these determinations is exemplified by the provision in Michigan law
allowing the Governor to impose conditions on the bankruptcy
filing.23
After the Emergency Manager for Detroit was appointed, there
was a race to the courthouse between local employee interests on the
one side and the Emergency Manager on the other. Employees and
retirees were preparing to file suit in state court to enjoin the
Governor and the Emergency Manager from taking any steps that
would negatively affect their pension rights, while the Emergency
Manager was preparing to file for federal bankruptcy protection,
presumably to do just that. Detroit filed its bankruptcy petition on
July 18, 2013, one day before Michigan Circuit Court Judge
Rosemarie Aquilina issued an “Order of Declaratory Judgment”
finding that any effort to use federal bankruptcy to reduce public
pension rights would violate the Michigan Constitution.24 Judge
Aquilina ordered Michigan’s Governor to direct Detroit’s Emergency
Manager to withdraw the bankruptcy petition and to not authorize

19. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10, cl. 1.
20. The bankruptcy judge in the Detroit case has determined that Detroit’s
pension obligations are not subject to any special priority. See In re City of Detroit,
Mich., No. 13-53846, 2013 WL 6331931, at *41 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Dec. 5, 2013). It
remains to be seen whether this conclusion is confirmed on appeal.
21. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 141.1566 (West, Westlaw through P.A. 2014, No.
55, of the 2014 Regular Sess. of the 97th Legis.).
22. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 141.1558 (West, Westlaw through P.A. 2014, No.
55, of the 2014 Regular Sess. of the 97th Legis.).
23. Id.
24. Order of Declaratory Judgment, Webster v. State, No. 13-734-CZ (Mich. Cir.
Ct., July 19, 2013).
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any further Chapter 9 filing “which threatens to diminish or impair
accrued pension benefits.”25 The state court did not rule out a future
Chapter 9 filing by Detroit, but implicitly urged the Governor to
impose conditions on any such filing that would protect pension
rights.
The trial court’s order requiring the withdrawal of the bankruptcy
petition has not been enforced. First, on July 23, 2013, the Michigan
Court of Appeals ordered that Judge Aquilina’s order be stayed
pending appeal.26 Then, on July 24, the federal bankruptcy court
issued an order staying the state court proceedings, directing that the
constitutionality of Detroit’s bankruptcy filing be litigated in the
federal bankruptcy court, along with other legal challenges to the
propriety of Detroit’s filing.27 The Michigan Attorney General has
also appeared in the bankruptcy litigation, in part to represent the
interests of pension holders.28 The Attorney General has apparently
taken the position that the City cannot constitutionally use the
bankruptcy to reduce its pension obligations.29 This position pits him
in opposition to Michigan’s Governor, who appears to favor pension
reductions as part of Detroit’s financial plan.30
This potential conflict between the Michigan Constitution and
federal bankruptcy law is incredibly interesting. In part, the issue
25. Id. at 2.
26. Bill Vlasic, Federal Judge Halts Legal Challenges in Detroit Bankruptcy Case,
N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 2013, at A14 (“Judge Aquilina’s ruling was appealed by the state
attorney general to the Michigan Court of Appeals, which on Tuesday issued a stay
of her order pending an appellate decision.”).
27. Id. (“Judge Rhodes [the federal bankruptcy court judge] settled the matter by
approving a motion by Mr. Orr to freeze all litigation against the city during its
bankruptcy. The judge said that concentrating all legal issues in federal court
increased the chances that Detroit could reorganize its debts and emerge from
bankruptcy in better financial shape.”).
28. See Attorney General Bill Scheutte’s Statement Regarding the Michigan
Constitution and the Bankruptcy of the City of Detroit at 1, In re City of Detroit,
Mich., No. 13-53846, 2013 WL 6331931 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Aug. 19, 2013), ECF No.
494.
29. Id. at *11 (“[T]he City and the emergency manager cannot propose a plan that
has the effect of diminishing or impairing the accrued rights of public-employee
pensions.”).
30. In his testimony before the bankruptcy court, Governor Rick Snyder declined
to answer directly whether reducing pension obligations was part of the plan that
included appointing an emergency manager and placing Detroit into bankruptcy. See
Nathan Bomey et al., Mich. Gov Calls Bankruptcy Right Decision for Detroit,
USATODAY, Oct. 29, 2013, http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/10/28/
detroit-bankruptcy-trial/3286147. It is widely believed, however, that he favors such
reductions. He admitted that he did not take any steps to protect pensions in
advance of the bankruptcy filing and he stated that he does not favor a state bailout
for Detroit. Id.
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boils down to whether a state law authorizing a municipal
government to file for federal bankruptcy protection can be found to
be unconstitutional under the state constitution.
Putting the
jurisdictional conflict between the state court and the federal
bankruptcy court to one side, in my view, it seems clear that a state
law authorizing municipal bankruptcy is subject to review under the
state constitution. Suppose a state’s constitution provided simply,
“Municipalities in this state may not file for bankruptcy protection
under any federal or state law.” Is there any reason to believe that
the provision of the federal bankruptcy code requiring state
permission for municipalities to use Chapter 9 overrides state
constitutional provisions prohibiting it, somehow investing the state
legislature with the power to ignore a provision of the state
constitution?
This would be contrary to the well-established
understanding that municipal governments are creatures of the state
and completely subject to control by state law, and that municipalities
have only those powers granted to them under state law. If anything,
the fact that municipalities need state permission to file for
bankruptcy should be viewed as enhancing state law as a limitation on
municipal bankruptcy, and the state constitution—as the supreme law
of the state—should prevail over any statute determined by the state’s
judicial branch to be in conflict with the state constitution.
A decision that the Michigan Constitution prohibits the state’s
municipalities from reducing their pension obligations in federal
bankruptcy would not amount to a denial of the supremacy of federal
law or be in the nature of state nullification of federal law.31 Rather,
such a decision would be an example of the sort of cooperative
federalism that has become increasingly common, under which
federal law is optional. Spending Clause regulation is the most
common of these—states do not violate federal law if they refuse to
expand Medicaid eligibility under the Affordable Care Act or if they
refuse to establish twenty-one as the minimum age for purchasing
alcoholic beverages, for example. Rather, they simply forgo whatever
federal benefits are attached to the rejected strings. It would not
violate federal law for a state’s supreme court to declare that
eighteen-year-olds have a state-constitutional right to drink beer and
wine, even if the court’s decision prevented a state from raising the

31. Cf. Frederick Tung, After Orange County: Reforming California Municipal
Bankruptcy Law, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 885, 887 (2002) (“Th[e] federal requirement of
state authorization derives from the Constitutional principle that the federal
government may not interfere with states’ internal governance.”).
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age to twenty-one to take advantage of federal highway construction
subsidies.
The jurisdictional conflict between the Michigan state court and
the federal bankruptcy court may create procedural complications,
but it should not alter the substantive outcome. Bankruptcy filings
normally stay other state and federal court proceedings involving the
debtor,32 but ultimately state law will govern the resolution of many of
those cases. If a Michigan court issues an authoritative decision
holding that it violates Michigan law for any Michigan or Detroit
official to use federal bankruptcy to diminish retiree benefits, the
federal bankruptcy court would have three options: (1) it could decide
that Detroit is ineligible to use Chapter 9; (2) it could live with the
state court’s decision and adjust all debts other than those covered by
Michigan law; or (3) it could ignore Michigan law and make
adjustments to retiree benefits, disregarding the Michigan
Constitution. The bankruptcy court in the Orange County, California
bankruptcy appears to have rejected the second option, finding that
“[b]y authorizing the use of chapter 9 by its municipalities, California
must accept chapter 9 in its totality; it cannot cherry pick what it likes
while disregarding the rest. The right to discharge is not a benefit
without burdens.”33 If the bankruptcy court cannot live with the
selective adjustment of Detroit’s debts pursuant to Michigan law, it
should find Detroit ineligible for Chapter 9 rather than go ahead with
the adjustment in disregard of Michigan’s protection of pension
rights.
In my view, the federal bankruptcy court should be bound by
Michigan law on the question of whether the municipality is
authorized to use Chapter 9 either generally or in a way that would
prejudice pension claimants. Given that this is a novel and difficult
issue of Michigan law, any determination the bankruptcy court or any
other federal court would make would only be a prediction, and may
be proven incorrect. Thus, whatever procedure the bankruptcy court
uses to decide whether the bankruptcy filing violates the Michigan
Constitution should allow the Michigan courts to have final say on
that issue. Had the Michigan Supreme Court invalidated the
Michigan statute authorizing municipal bankruptcy before any
Michigan municipality had filed, perhaps on a facial challenge shortly
after the law was passed, the federal bankruptcy court would not be

32. The Bankruptcy Code’s automatic stay provisions apply in Chapter 9 cases.

See 11 U.S.C. § 901(a) (2012).
33. In re Cnty. of Orange, 191 B.R. 1005, 1021 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1996).
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free to ignore that decision and allow Michigan’s municipalities to file
for bankruptcy anyway.
The interaction between the Contract Clause and federal
bankruptcy laws might seem to be in tension with the possibility that
state constitutional protections of pension rights limit the ability of
municipal governments to use Chapter 9 to reduce those rights.
Although Contract Clause doctrine is flexible and has been found to
allow significant pension reform,34 the clause does place limits on the
ability of state and local governments to adjust their pension
liabilities. Constitutional provisions protecting pension rights like
Michigan’s are drafted with the Contract Clause in mind, because
they clearly meet one of the requirements for Contract Clause
protection—that the state or local promise be contractual in nature.35
The Contract Clause, by its terms, applies only to states, which is why
federal municipal bankruptcy is possible. If the state itself simply
reduced pension payments as part of a state-run reform of municipal
finances, there is a good possibility that a court would find a violation
of the Contract Clause. Because federal law is not subject to the
Contract Clause, a bankruptcy court judgment reducing state or local
pension payments raises no similar issue.36
The question is whether the fact that federal bankruptcy law can
overcome Contract Clause protections based on state contractual
commitments means that federal bankruptcy law should also
overcome state constitutional limits of municipal power to employ
federal bankruptcy. While this is a novel legal question, I do not
think there is very much to it. I recognize the analogy, but the key
difference is that in the Contract Clause case, the purported conflict is
between two aspects of federal law, the Contract Clause and Chapter
9 of the Bankruptcy Code; and the Contract Clause simply does not
apply to federal law.37 State constitutional limits apply to all state
action regardless of federal law. In extreme cases, for example when

34. See, e.g., Parker v. Wakelin, 123 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1997).
35. See generally Beermann, supra note 2, at 48 (citing Gen. Motors Corp. v.
Romein, 503 U.S. 181, 186 (1992)).
36. The first federal municipal bankruptcy law was invalidated by the Supreme
Court in part on Contract Clause grounds. See Ashton v. Cameron Cnty. Water
Improvement Dist., 298 U.S. 513, 530–32 (1936). A later federal municipal
bankruptcy law was upheld, see United States v. Bekins, 304 U.S. 27, 50–51 (1938),
and it is no longer thought that the Contract Clause limits the federal bankruptcy
power.
37. See Beermann, supra note 2, at 67 (citing Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. R.A.
Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717, 730 (1984)). see also Pension Benefit, 467 U.S. at 732 n.9.
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state constitutional law invidiously discriminates,38 federal
constitutional law might have something to say about state
constitutional limitations on state governmental power, but there is
no similar reason to denigrate state constitutional protection of
pension rights.
In fact, there are reasons to believe that Congress intended to
preserve state and local authority over municipal bankruptcy. As
noted, municipalities need the state’s permission to file under
Chapter 9. Further, several additional provisions of Chapter 9
recognize the special status of states and municipalities. Municipal
bankruptcy cannot be involuntary—the municipality must choose to
use Chapter 9 to deal with its financial difficulties.39 Further, Chapter
9 prohibits the bankruptcy court from interfering with the
municipality’s governmental and political powers without the
municipality’s consent,40 and there is no provision for liquidation of a
municipality by the federal bankruptcy court.41 Chapter 9 also
conditions the approval of the plan for adjustment on a finding that
“the debtor is not prohibited by law from taking any action necessary
to carry out the plan.”42 In short, numerous provisions of the federal
municipal bankruptcy law recognize that federal law should interfere
as little as possible with the structure and operation of local
governments in the federal bankruptcy process.
In sum, for better or for worse, many states have enacted special
constitutional and statutory protections for state and local pension
participants.43 Although these state provisions might not grant
priority to pension obligations that would be recognized by a federal
bankruptcy court, they may limit the authority of state officials to use
bankruptcy to reduce local pension obligations. Federal bankruptcy
courts should respect state court decisions finding that, under state
constitutional law, state and local officials may not employ federal

38. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635–36 (1996) (striking down Colorado
constitutional provision, passed by referendum, prohibiting the state and local
governments from protecting homosexuals from discrimination).
39. See 11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(4) (2012).
40. Id. § 904(1).
41. See Skeel, Jr., supra note 1, 693 n.70.
42. 11 U.S.C. § 943(b)(4). The Attorney General of Michigan is apparently
arguing that this provision, in conjunction with the Michigan Constitution’s pension
protection clause, prohibits reduction of Detroit’s pension obligations in bankruptcy.
The argument is that Michigan law prohibits any reduction in pension benefits so
under § 943(b)(4) the bankruptcy court may not order any reduction. It remains to
be seen whether this is a correct interpretation of this provision of Chapter 9.
43. See Beermann, supra note 2, at 37–43 (discussing, among others,
constitutional provisions in Michigan, New York, Illinois, Arizona, and California).
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bankruptcy to reduce pension obligations to current or retired
municipal workers.
II. PENSION CONTROVERSIES IN MICHIGAN AND ILLINOIS
There are at least two more cases in the federal courts challenging
changes to the retirement benefits of Michigan municipal employees,
but neither case has addressed the issue of whether reductions in
retiree benefits violate the Michigan Constitution’s pension
protection provision. In Welch v. Brown, an Emergency Manager
appointed under Michigan law to address the City of Flint’s financial
difficulties unilaterally changed city retirees’ health care benefits,
making their health insurance more expensive.44 The federal district
court issued a temporary restraining order against the alterations,
finding that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on their claim that
the changes violated the federal Contract Clause.45 In City of Pontiac
Retired Employees Ass’n v. Schimmel, after the Emergency Manager
appointed to deal with the finances of the City of Pontiac altered
Pontiac retirees’ health benefits, a different federal district judge
refused to issue a temporary restraining order, finding that even if the
plaintiffs were likely to succeed on their claims that the changes
violated the Contract Clause, they had not established that they
would suffer irreparable harm if the changes were allowed to go into
effect and then were reversed later when the merits of the lawsuit
were reached.46 This latter decision was reversed by the Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit on the grounds that, under the doctrine
of constitutional avoidance, the federal court should have first
addressed whether possible procedural defects in the Michigan
legislature’s passage of the statute authorizing the Emergency
Manager to act violated the Michigan Constitution, thus potentially
mooting the federal constitutional claims.47 Interestingly, a dissenter
would have reached the merits of the federal constitutional claims
and would have rejected them, in part on the ground that “the
[Emergency Manager’s] efforts to address the City of Pontiac’s
impending insolvency serve a legitimate public purpose” satisfying
the requirements of the federal Contract Clause.48

44. Welch v. Brown, 935 F. Supp. 2d 875 (E.D. Mich. 2013).
45. Id. at 887-889.
46. City of Pontiac Retired Emps. Ass’n v. Schimmel, No. 12-12830, 2012 WL
2532763, at *2 (E.D. Mich. 2012), rev’d, 726 F.3d 767 (6th Cir. 2013).
47. Schimmel, 726 F.3d at 769.
48. Id. at 786 (Griffin, J., dissenting).
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There is also an interesting dispute over pension reform in Illinois.
The Illinois Constitution contains a provision protecting public
pension rights similar to the one found in the Michigan Constitution:
“Membership in any pension or retirement system of the State, any
unit of local government or school district, or any agency or
instrumentality thereof, shall be an enforceable contractual
relationship, the benefits of which shall not be diminished or
impaired.”49 Illinois public pensions may be in worse financial
condition than in any other state. They are certainly terribly
underfunded.50 Although there has been some recent talk about
Chicago following Detroit into bankruptcy,51 it is unclear whether
municipalities in Illinois can actually use federal bankruptcy. Some
have tried and their petitions have been dismissed.52 There is no
general provision in Illinois law allowing municipalities to file for
federal bankruptcy protection, only a provision that, after a fiscal
emergency has been declared, a commission established by the
Governor may “recommend that the unit of local government file a
petition under Chapter 9 of the United States Bankruptcy Code.”53
The statute does not specify who is to receive this recommendation
and it does not authorize any entity to actually file a petition.
At the state level, there has been pressure for state pension reform
from the business community.54 Everyone agrees that Illinois pension
systems are grossly underfunded and that the underfunding has

49. ILL. CONST. art. XIII, § 5.
50. See ILL. GEN. ASSEMBLY, REPORT OF THE PENSION MODERNIZATION TASK
FORCE, H.R.J. RES. NO. 65, at 10 (2009), available at http://cgfa.ilga.gov/upload/
112009pensiontaskforcereport.pdf (showing more than $61 billion in state pension
underfunding as of 2009). More recently, Crain’s Chicago Business has estimated the
shortfall to be more than $100 billion. See Paul Merrion, Illinois Hits a Sorry
Milestone, CRAIN’S CHI. BUS. (Mar. 25, 2013), http://www.chicagobusiness.com/
article/20130323/ISSUE01/303239976/illinois-hits-a-sorry-milestone.
51. See Jacob Huebert, What the Detroit Bankruptcy Ruling Means for Illinois,
ILL. POL’Y INST. (Dec. 3, 2013), http://illinoispolicy.org/what-the-detroit-bankruptcyruling-means-for-illinois.
52. See In re Slocum Lake Drainage Dist. of Lake Cnty., 336 B.R. 387, 391 (N.D.
Ill. 2006); Judge Denies Washington Park’s Bankruptcy Bid, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Jan.
11, 2011, available at http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/illinois/judge-denieswashington-park-s-bankruptcy-bid/article_9db5faee-7ab1-5d6d-b29c0938a11f7a00.html (reporting that the Village of Washington Park, Illinois, was found
to have no authority to file Chapter 9 bankruptcy petition).
53. 50 ILL. COMP. STAT. 320/9(b)(4) (West, 2005).
54. See, e.g., Eric M. Madiar, Is Welching on Public Pension Promises an Option
for Illinois? An Analysis of Article XIII, Section 5 of the Illinois Constitution 41–44
(July 5, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1774163 (discussing The Commercial Club of Chicago and
Sidley Austin LLP’s report on Illinois pensions).
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resulted in large part from state legislature’s failure to make
actuarially adequate contributions to the funds.55 In some years,
pension obligation bonds were issued and even some of the proceeds
of those bonds were diverted to other purposes in the state budget.
However, until very recently, the Illinois General Assembly was
unwilling to pass significant reforms.56
The Illinois General Assembly formed a task force that in 2009
issued a report on pension funding problems.57 The Civic Committee
of the Commercial Club of Chicago, an organization of business
leaders formed in the late nineteenth century, issued a minority
report recommending cuts to benefits already earned by existing
employees and perhaps increased employee contributions.58 The
Commercial Club also placed some of the blame for underfunding on
overly generous benefits and abuses such as working two state jobs to
earn two pensions.59 Although the scope of its recommendations is
somewhat unclear, the Commercial Club’s report apparently relied on
a legal analysis of Illinois public pension law conducted by the law
firm of the club’s president.60 In response, the Chief Legal Counsel to
the Illinois Senate President wrote a lengthy Article, the last thirty
pages of which attempt to rebut the legal analysis underlying the
Commercial Club’s report.61 The Article concludes that Illinois law
does not allow any reduction in promised future benefits to current
employees, and it also prohibits requiring increased employee
contributions for the same level of benefits.62 Although the Article’s
conclusions are supported by Illinois case law, it remains to be seen
whether the Illinois courts will uphold the reforms recently enacted.
The latest chapter in the Illinois pension saga began when the
Governor, an advocate of pension reform, vetoed the line in this fiscal
year’s state budget providing pay for legislators, stating that

55. See Id. (manuscript at 1–3).
56. On December 5, 2013, Illinois Governor Pat Quinn signed a major reform of
Illinois public pensions into law. See 2013 Ill Legis. Serv. S.B.1 (West). This
legislation has been challenged by public employees as violating the state’s
constitutional pension protections. See Monique Garcia, Pension Fight Shifting to

Court: Attorneys Have Spent Years Preparing for Battle over Provision in State
Constitution, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 5, 2013, at 1.
57. ILLINOIS GENERAL ASSEMBLY, REPORT OF THE PENSION MODERNIZATION
TASK FORCE, supra note 40.
58. See Minority Report of the Civic Committee of the Commercial Club of
Chicago, in ILL. GEN. ASSEMBLY., supra note 40, at 61.
59. See id. at 67–68.
60. See Madiar, supra note 54 (manuscript at 43).
61. Id. (manuscript at 44–76).
62. Id. (manuscript at 77).
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legislators should not be paid until they enact pension reform.63 The
Governor also voluntarily refused his salary during the controversy.64
The legislators responded by filing suit against the Governor,
claiming that the Governor’s veto violated the Illinois Constitution;
the trial court has found in favor of the legislators and ordered their
pay restored.65 After the legislature passed a pension reform bill,
Governor Quinn dropped his appeal of this ruling and apparently will
receive backpay for the time during which he refused his own salary.66
III. REFORM IS COMING: WHO SHOULD PAY?
It seems clear that in many state and local governments, pension
reform is coming. In some locales, retirees are likely to see increased
health care costs and even reduced pension payments, whether
through municipal bankruptcy, fiscal emergency management, or
state legislation. For future employees, reform may take the form of
reduced promises and perhaps a shift away from defined benefit plans
to defined contribution plans,67 and a move to have workers take
advantage of federal Medicare rather than maintain the entitlement
that exists in some places to lifetime private insurance coverage. In
recent months, we have seen this last shift in the private sector, with
large corporations closing their retiree health care plans and
substituting cash payments to retirees, with which they are supposed
to purchase their own insurance on the market.68
63. See generally Rick Pearson, Quinn Gets No Relief in Court, Judge Sticks by
Restoring Pay for Legislators, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 28, 2013, at 4, available at 2013
WLNR 24309039.
64. Id. at 2.
65. See Cullerton v. Quinn, No. 13 CH 17921, 2013 WL 5366345, at *4–5 (Ill. Cir.
Ct. Sep. 26, 2013) (finding that veto of legislative salaries violated Ill. Const. Art. IV,
§ 11, which prohibits changes to the salary of Members of the Illinois General
Assembly in the middle of a term).
66. Monique Garcia, Quinn Drops Appeal on Lawmaker Paychecks: Governor’s
Bid to Block Legislators’ Salaries over Pension Bill Overruled, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 15,
2013, at 5, available at 2013 WLNR 31347057.
67. As Professor Paul Secunda pointed out at the conference for which this essay
was prepared, defined contribution plans have problems of their own, mainly due to
faulty design. According to Professor Secunda, many employees in voluntary defined
contribution plans tend not to save enough and do not have adequate information or
knowledge to direct their investments. These problems could easily be resolved
through better plan design. See Professor Paul M. Secunda, Professor of Law,
Marquette Univ. Sch. of Law, Remarks at the Fordham Urban Law Journal’s Annual
Cooper-Walsh Colloquium (Oct. 11, 2013) (on file with the Fordham Urban Law
Journal).
68. See Press Release, Aon Hewitt, Aon Hewitt Survey Shows Growing Number
of Companies Favoring Individual Market-Based Strategies for Post-65 Retirees
(Aug 6, 2013), available at http://aon.mediaroom.com/2013-08-06-Aon-Hewitt-
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One view of public pension reform is that it should be understood
in the context of the national labor market and the negative political
atmosphere surrounding the status of public employees. Union
membership is at an extremely low level in the private workforce,
while it remains relatively strong in public employment. In the
private sector, good jobs with benefits for relatively low skilled
workers have become increasingly difficult to come by. In the retail
and fast food sectors, employers have taken advantage of the weak
job market by maintaining a largely part-time work force, paying low
wages without benefits and not providing workers with regular
schedules, which makes it difficult for them to earn a living by
working at multiple jobs. It has even been reported that some fast
food employers provide counseling to full-time employees on how to
qualify for government benefits such as food stamps.69 Even in
traditionally high-wage lower-skilled occupations, more recently hired
workers are paid less and have lower benefits than long-time
employees who began their employment when unions were still
relatively strong. Income inequality in the United States is at an alltime high and is still growing.70 Despite recent strikes by low-wage
fast food workers, the balance of power at the low end of the wage
scale is tilted strongly on the side of employers.
In my earlier Article on the public pension crisis, I show that the
issue of whether public employees are overcompensated is hotly
contested.
While some of the research indicates that public
employees are overcompensated as compared to the private sector,
other research indicates that after controlling for age, education and
experience, public sector employees are somewhat underpaid.71 An
element of the supposed overcompensation of public employees is
that they are allegedly entitled to overly generous pensions and postretirement health care benefits. In response, one fact often touted by
those claiming that public employee retirement benefits are not
unreasonable is that the average public employee pension is
something close to $20,000, and many public employees did not pay

Survey-Shows-Growing-Number-of-Companies-Favoring-Individual-Market-BasedStrategies-for-Post-65-Retirees.
69. See Emily Cohn, McDonald’s Tells Worker She Should Sign Up For Food
Stamps, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 24, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/
10/24/mcdonalds-food-stamps_n_4151647.html.
70. See Emmanuel Saez, Striking it Richer: The Evolution of Top Incomes in the
United States 2 (Sept. 3, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://elsa.berkeley.edu/~saez/saez-UStopincomes-2012.pdf (Updated with 2012
preliminary estimates).
71. See generally Beermann, supra note 2.
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into the federal Social Security system, so they do not receive those
benefits.72 It is not always known, however, how much service it took
for retirees to earn that $20,000 pension73 and thus it is not a very
useful metric for making an informed judgment about the situation of
pension claimants.
It is not clear how long the generally favorable conditions in public
employment, as compared to the private sector, will last. Public
sector collective bargaining was the focal point in 2011 in Wisconsin,
when the newly-elected Governor and the state legislature moved to
eliminate the right of most public employees in the state to collective
bargaining over anything but wages.74 Employees’ required health
care and pension contributions were also increased at the same time.75
While teachers’ unions have long been blamed by some for the
problems of the public schools, the pension crisis has focused
attention on the compensation and benefits of all state and local
employees. Public employees have been portrayed as overpaid both
in terms of current compensation and especially with regard to
retirement benefits, including pensions and health care. Although the
predominant cause of the public pension crisis seems to be the fiscal
irresponsibility of state legislatures, the recent focus on state and local
pensions and retiree health care benefits may be softening the public
up for acceptance of major reforms that would significantly reduce
benefits.
Although the changes in Wisconsin did not spark an immediate
nationwide effort to restrict or eliminate public employee collective
bargaining, it would not be surprising if pension reformers target
public employee unions. Perhaps the most telling attack on public
employee unions is Professor Daniel DiSalvo’s 2010 Article in

72. See Beermann, supra note 2, at 8.
73. According to a recent report by the Auditor General and Inspector General
of Michigan, in Detroit, an employee retiring after twenty-five years at a final salary
of $46,000 per year would earn a lifetime pension of approximately $20,000 per year,
as would an employee retiring after thirty years at a final salary of $36,000, an
employee retiring after thirty-five years at a final salary of $30,000 and an employee
retiring after forty years at a salary of $26,000. See OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GEN. &
OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., EMERGENCY MANAGER ORDER NO. 8: INITIAL 60
DAY REPORT 6 (2013), available at http://www.detroitmi.gov/Portals/0/docs/EM/
Reports/EMO8%20FINAL%20REPORT%20Sept%2026%202013.pdf.
74. See generally Dean Mosiman, Public Employees Begin Seeing Smaller
Paychecks, WIS. STATE J., Aug. 26, 2011, available at 2011 WLNR 16894727.
75. Id.
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National Affairs, The Trouble with Public Sector Unions.76 Whether
you agree with it or not, the Article is thoughtful and thought
provoking, and lays much of the blame for state and local fiscal
problems at the feet of public employee unions.77 With regard to
pensions, Disalvo explains that:
[M]any lawmakers found that increasing pensions was very good
politics. They placated unions with future pension commitments,
and then turned around, borrowed the money appropriated for the
pensions, and spent it paying for public services in the here and now.
Politicians liked this scheme because they could satisfy the unions,
provide generous public services without raising taxes to pay for
them, and even sometimes get around balanced-budget
requirements.78

My only quibble with Disalvo’s analysis here is that he omits the
fact that politicians’ failure to actually appropriate funds for the
pensions often contributed to the underfunding, which led to the
severe fiscal problems we see in so many state and local governments.
Disalvo recognizes that more than government finances and
policymaking are at stake in efforts to reform public sector labor
relations. He sees very clearly the connection between collective
bargaining and the status of lower-skilled workers. As he portrays it,
“In today’s public sector, good pay, generous benefits and job security
make possible a stable middle class existence for nearly everyone
from janitors to jailors. In the private economy, meanwhile, cutthroat
competition, increased income inequality, and layoffs squeeze the
middle class.”79 The subtext here is that just as consumers and
shareholders benefit from low wages in the private sector, which keep
many workers from earning a living wage, so too should taxpayers be
able to take advantage of the competitive labor market to reduce
76. See Daniel Disalvo, The Trouble with Public Sector Unions, NAT’L AFF., Fall
2010, at 3, available at http://www.nationalaffairs.com/doclib/20100918_DiSalvo_
pdf[1].pdf.
77. I do not agree with Professor Disalvo’s conclusions concerning the negative
effects of public sector unions. In my view, Professor Disalvo’s analysis lacks context.
I assume he is correct that unionization has resulted in better pay, benefits, and
working conditions for public employees. That is the whole point of collective action
by labor. The question I am left with is what situation would we be in without public
employee unions? Would things be much better, or would business lobbying divert
an even greater share of public resources to business interests at the expense of the
taxpaying public and government workers? In my view, there is a significant chance
that many social problems such as climate change, environmental pollution,
dangerous work places, income inequality, poor public education, and tax inequity
would be worse without the voice of organized labor in the political mix.
78. Disalvo, supra note 76, at 15.
79. Id. at 5.
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government expenses, even if that drives another group of workers
out of the middle class. There is something even larger than the fight
over public pension rights underlying this discussion. It is about
whether the United States economy will support a thriving middle
class, or whether it will join the many countries in the world that are
divided between rich and poor.
Millions of people have trillions of dollars at stake in their pension
and retiree health care benefits, and many state and local
governments across the United States are in a fiscal squeeze. Should
these state and local governments solve their fiscal problems at the
expense of their employees, retired and active? Strict insistence that
municipal governments live up to every promise they have made to all
retirees and employees may cripple their ability to recover from the
financial crisis or provide the level of services taxpayers demand
(often without willingness to pay enough in taxes to fund them).
Politically, placing the burden on employees is likely to be more
palatable than placing it on taxpayers. The employees and retirees
involved, however, have strong normative claims that they should not
bear the brunt of the reforms necessary to resolve governmental fiscal
problems. The question is, who should?
Employee retirement benefits, including pensions and health care
benefits, should be protected from significant reduction both within
and outside of municipal bankruptcy. These benefits were earned
over time, often in exchange for reduced current compensation and
fewer opportunities for advancement. The average current or retired
government employee is not to blame in any realistic sense of the
word for the fiscal predicament of state and local governments, unless
you accept Disalvo’s conclusion that government’s problems stem in
large part from an unholy alliance between politicians and public
employee unions. In my earlier Article, I acknowledge that public
employees may sometimes receive favorable treatment due to the
expectation that they will support incumbent politicians, but most
government employees have little if any direct involvement with
political officials such that their pay and benefits should be viewed as
more political than compensation for services provided. The primary
pathology that led to the underfunding of public pensions is the
political desire to provide more services to the public than the public
is willing to pay for in current taxation. At the federal level, this is
done by running deficits, currently amounting to more than $16
trillion. At the state and local level, this has been accomplished in
part by underfunding retirement benefits to government employees,
which means that current taxpayers are not paying the full costs of the
services and programs they enjoy every day. The primary target for
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resolving state and local financial problems should be the taxpayers,
not current and former employees.
For several reasons, Detroit may be a special case. Many of
Detroit’s taxpayers are in a worse predicament than current or retired
workers. Property values in Detroit have plummeted, unemployment
has skyrocketed, and many public services have virtually disappeared.
Meanwhile, there are suggestions of fraud and other abuses in the
Detroit pension system.80 In contrast to those in Central Falls,
bondholders in Detroit are unlikely to be paid in full.81 If significant
cuts are made to Detroit pension and retiree health care payments,
the cuts should be based on Detroit’s special circumstances, and not
on a general model of municipal debt adjustment or bankruptcy that
would provide a national precedent for cuts to pension and other
retiree benefits.
Significant cuts to state and local pensions would likely place large
numbers of older Americans at risk of falling into poverty, especially
those who did not participate in the federal Social Security program.
In recent decades, there have been bailouts and compensation funds
established when disaster strikes. As I note in my prior Article on the
public pension crisis, the website propublica.com reported that 937
institutions received more than $600 billion in federal bailout funds
during the recent financial crisis, including nearly $200 billion to
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, and nearly $70 billion to the insurance
company AIG. 82 In the late 1980s and early 1990s, there was an
enormous government bailout of the savings and loan industry.83
When natural disasters strike, government provides significant aid to
victims. How should society treat those likely to be thrown into
poverty if their state or local pension is significantly cut?
Throwing a large number of elderly Americans into poverty would
cause a major national public policy problem. The federally-funded

80. See, e.g., Steve Neavling, Detroit Emergency Manager Launches Pension
Corruption Probe, REUTERS, June 20, 2013, available at http://www.reuters.com/
article/2013/06/21/us-usa-detroit-pensions-idUSBRE95J11820130621; see also OFFICE
OF THE AUDITOR GEN & OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 73, at 7 (noting
gross discrepancies between W2 data and salary amounts).
81. For an interesting discussion of the plight of bondholders with investments in
municipalities with financial problems, see Clayton P. Gillette, Bondholders and
Financially Stressed Municipalities, 39 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 639 (2012). Gillette
highlights the uncertainty concerning priorities in municipal bankruptcy. See id. at
646–47 & n.55.
82. Bailout Recipients, PROPUBLICA.COM (Oct. 12, 2012), http://projects.
propublica.org/bailout/list.
83. See FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., THE S&L CRISIS: A CHRONO-BIBLIOGRAPHY,
available at http://www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/s%26l.
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health care system would likely become responsible for billions of
dollars in health care costs to the newly impoverished. Perhaps what
the situation calls for is an ambitious plan administered the way
Kenneth Feinberg has administered funds like the 9/11 fund and the
fund set up by BP Oil Co. to compensate victims of the 2010 oil spill
in the Gulf of Mexico,84 or the way that Trustee Irving Picard has
distributed the assets available after the discovery of Bernard
Madoff’s Ponzi scheme.
The central normative question is whether pension claimants
should be treated more like the innocent victims of a financial disaster
or like the investors in Bernard Madoff’s Ponzi scheme. In a disaster,
whether it is a natural disaster, a terrorist strike, or an industrial
accident, outside funding is used to ameliorate the financial
consequences that would otherwise occur. In the Madoff case,
investors were paid only out of the funds that the trustee could
recover either in Madoff’s assets or clawbacks from investors who had
received distributions from Madoff in excess of what they had
invested.
Under the most uncharitable view of their situation, public pension
claimants could be portrayed as in a similar situation to Madoff’s
investors. Just as Madoff led his investors to believe that their
accounts were worth much more than was actually there, pension
claimants have been misled by government into believing that their
employer or former employer has or will have sufficient funds to pay
the full retirement benefits promised. Just like Madoff’s investors,
they should have realized that the promises were unrealistic, but their
greed blinded them to what should have been obvious. Pension
claimants are even more to blame than Madoff’s investors, because
they bargained for the excessive and unrealistic promises that are
weighing government down. Under this characterization, the most
pension claimants should be entitled to is a proportionate share of the
assets actually available to pay their claims, which in some state and
local governments may be fifty cents on the dollar or even less.
For many reasons, I do not believe that it would be fair or practical
to treat pension claimants like the investors in Bernard Madoff’s
Ponzi scheme. On practicality first, in many situations, it would be
very difficult to identify the assets that pension claimants would share.
Few government pension programs are fully funded, and it was
always anticipated that funds might be augmented by current

84. John Schwartz, In Boston as Before, One Man Divides Charity After Tragedy,
N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 2013, at A10.
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appropriations to make sure that all payments can be made. It might
also be impossible to segregate the funds that have been appropriated
into the various pension programs that may be underfunded to a
greater or lesser degree. Perhaps the necessary accounting would be
possible for pension funds that are held in trusts separate from other
government finances, but it would be very difficult when separate
accounts are not maintained.
The argument against this sort of treatment is stronger from a
fairness perspective. Unlike Bernard Madoff’s investors, pension
claimants were promised their pension payments in exchange for
services performed, not merely as passive investors in a financial
scheme. The governmental unit received decades of service from the
people whose pensions are now at risk. Further, for each state or
municipal pension system, except perhaps in a few extreme cases, the
magnitude of the promises, while generous, was not so out of line
with other governmental pensions that employees should have been
on notice that their expectations were unreasonable. Along the same
lines, the typical government worker was not complicit in creating the
pension mess in any meaningful sense. Government workers would
have preferred that their pensions be fully or close to fully funded,
and they did not join in any sort of overt scheme to procure excessive
payments. In some cases, state governments failed to appropriate
sufficient funds to make actuarially required pension contributions
while at the same time cutting state taxes.85 Also, government
workers cannot easily diversify the risk of non-payment of pensions
the way smart investors can diversify the risk of poor performance or
fraud in their investments. Of course, workers can choose private
employment or a public position with a defined contribution pension
plan, but employment is nowhere near as mobile as money in terms of
saving for retirement.
Should government pension claimants be thought of as innocent
victims of a fiscal disaster who should be bailed out the way the
government bailed out significant elements of the financial industry
after the 2008 financial crisis, or the way government created a fund
to compensate families for the loss of life in the 2001 terrorist attacks?
In my view, pension claimants are closer to this characterization than
to the blameworthy characterization described above. The average
government employee did not engage in any improper practice that
led to excessive pension promises. Of course, if you believe that

85. See Beermann, supra note 2, at 44 n.151 (discussing New Jersey’s failure to
pay into public pension funds while cutting taxes).
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unions are the devil in all of this, then union membership and
enjoyment of the fruits of collective bargaining is enough to cast
blame on even the lowliest government employee. But for most
government employees, a day’s work earned a day’s pay, and pension
promises were simply part of the compensation that was promised.
Workers had no more control than the average taxpayer over how
much was set aside each year to meet future retirement obligations,
and taxpayers enjoyed the benefits of the government services
provided by the employees without paying their full, current, cost.
Perhaps comparing pension claimants to victims of other disasters
would be helpful. Although in the abstract it might be tempting to
place blame for losses on people who choose to live or establish
businesses in tornado prone areas or along earthquake fault lines, in
general we do not withhold disaster relief from such people. In flood
zones, the federal government offers flood insurance, and once
premiums are paid, we don’t question the entitlement to benefits
because the victims chose to live in a flood zone. Pension claimants,
having worked for their pension rights, are in a similar position to
property owners who have paid flood insurance premiums and find it
necessary to file a claim. The lobbying and bargaining that pension
claimants may engage in should not disqualify them from
consideration any more than the political process that leads to
disaster relief, or other favorable treatment, should disqualify those
recipients.
All government action stems from some level of
bargaining and lobbying.
In my view, departure from the principle of full payment of
pension promises is justified only if, pursuant to an appropriate
process, it becomes clear that some aspect of promised benefits is
abusive and unrelated to the legitimate purposes of a pension system.
The core pension benefit based on some measure of the recipient’s
final pay should be preserved. This principle does not rule out
reforms aimed at cutting potentially abusive practices that allow for
what is known as pension “spiking.” Some jurisdictions, for example,
no longer allow longevity pay to be included in pension calculations,
especially the sort of longevity pay that is awarded on notice of
retirement simply to increase pension payments.86 It would not be

86. For example, one feature of New Hampshire’s 2011 pension reform statute
was to eliminate longevity pay that is awarded simply by announcing the intent to
retire from pension calculations. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 100-A:1(XVII)(b)(4)
(LexisNexis 2012) (“Earnable compensation shall not include incentives to encourage
members to retire, severance pay or end-of-career additional longevity payments, and
pay for unused sick or vacation time.”).
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contrary to this principle to disallow the inclusion of second jobs in
pension calculations. So, for example, public school teachers cannot
increase their pensions by teaching at community colleges during
their last few years when pension benefits are calculated. Accounting
errors and abuses should also be correctable. Non-salary benefits,
such as housing or transportation allowances, might also be
appropriately eliminated from pension calculations. Overtime may
also be properly excluded from pension calculations in most
circumstances, although for some government employment in which
overtime is routine and expected as part of the position, it might be
appropriate to include it. If employees make contributions to pension
funds based on their overtime, then they ought to receive benefits
accordingly.
The issue becomes more difficult when highly paid government
employees retire with pensions that appear exorbitant. Should the
chancellor of a state university system receive a lifetime pension of
more than $200,000 per year based on a final salary of approximately
$300,000, or should there be a maximum pension cap established?
Does it matter that officials of private organizations of similar size
and complexity often receive even more in pay and retirement
benefits? It may be fair to pay the full pension since the leader of a
state university system may have declined or failed to pursue private
opportunities in reliance on the pay and benefits package promised
by the state. High salary and pension promises are not reason alone
for failure to pay.
Assuming that cuts to some pension payments are inevitable, each
state needs a comprehensive review of the pension system under clear
guidelines established in a process that includes input from all
affected parties. The leader of that process should act with intellect,
political sensitivity and compassion, as the administrators of other
compensation and relief funds have done in recent years. Of course,
ultimately judges and politicians will make the decisions about
whether cuts will occur and of what magnitude. In some states, in
reliance on state constitutional protections of public pension rights
and Contract Clause principles, the courts may refuse to allow any
cuts, and if municipal bankruptcy is not authorized, state and local
workers in these states may be fully protected. According to one
analysis, the Bankruptcy Code itself should be understood to place
serious limits on the discharge of pension liabilities by cities such as
Detroit.87 The claim here is that 11 U.S.C. § 943(b)(7)’s requirement

87. See BIENENSTOCK & MILLER, supra note 17, at 21–24.
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that municipal bankruptcy plans be “in the best interests of creditors”
means that “creditors are entitled to Detroit’s going concern value,
not its liquidation value.”88 The legislative history cited in support of
this claim indicates that this provision “is intended to provide more of
a return to creditors than the liquidation value” and should “allow the
municipal unit to continue operating while it adjusts or refinances
creditor claims with minimum (and in many cases, no) loss to
creditors.”89
In my view, if cuts are made, care should be taken to preserve the
core of a pension that meets the legitimate expectations of workers.
To me, for instance, the fifty-five percent cut imposed on Central
Falls, Rhode Island retirees was too harsh, and if a municipality lacks
the funds to pay enough to maintain a sufficient pension system, the
state should be forced appropriate funds to make up the difference.
To reduce a promised pension from $25,000 annually to $11,250,
especially for a person who did not pay into federal social security, is
cruel, and the law should not allow this to happen, whether inside
bankruptcy or out. Entities with the power to tax should not be
allowed to treat their employees that way.
Retiree health care presents a more difficult problem because of
the enormous cost increases that have occurred in recent years. Many
government employees are promised lifetime health care at little or
no cost to them, and few if any governmental units set aside money in
advance to fund this obligation. It is unlikely that anyone anticipated
the magnitude of recent increases in health care costs. In pure
contract law terms, the magnitude of the unanticipated cost increases
may provide a defense to the charge of breach of contract if a
government employer forced retirees to contribute more to health
care costs than had been agreed or promised. It does not seem to be
unfair to ask retired employees to modestly increase their
contribution to their health care costs in an environment in which
everyone is paying substantially more. The increase, or any cut to
benefits, should not be so large that it imposes serious hardship on
retirees, but just as Medicare costs increase over time, it is reasonable
to expect state and local retirees to contribute more to their health
care in an era of skyrocketing costs.

88. Id. at 22.
89. See id. at 22 (quoting S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 113, 263 (2d Sess. 1978)).
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CONCLUSION
The Detroit bankruptcy filing highlights how underfunded pension
promises are contributing to financial distress for municipalities and
states across the United States. Before municipal bankruptcy
becomes the accepted, if not routine, means employed by distressed
cities and towns to restructure and reduce their pension obligations, a
great deal of thought should be given to the plight of current and
retired workers who are counting on their pensions for economic
security late in life. Employees and retirees cannot diversify their risk
the way that investors and most other creditors can. They cannot
retroactively participate in the federal Social Security system or easily
change careers after they discover that their pensions are insecure. In
general, state and local governments should live up to the pension
promises they made to their employees, subject to reasonable reforms
to protect against abusive practices that push some pensions beyond
what makes economic sense in light of the employee’s salary before
retirement. The fiscal problems currently being experienced by many
state and local governments should not be solved predominantly on
the backs of pension claimants.

